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Industrial and technological improvements have globalized 
environmental problems. This reality has developed the environmental 
conscience both at national and international levels and almost all states 
have formed their own environmental policies.
The environmental disasters which transpass national boundaries 
put'forth the reality that they can only find solution by the cooperation of 
those states concerned. The serious effects of the tankers and oil spills 
caused by tanker accidents or other operations cannot be 
underestimated. The tanker accidents which have occurred for years in 
the Turkish Straits have put them in an ecological danger and require 
some technical and legislative amendments for the protection of this 
region which has a historical value and strategic importance for today's 
Turkey.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to stress the importance and the 
seriousness of this issue; and to show that precautions must be taken 
not'only for security purposes but also for ecological protection. By an 
analysis of the case of the Turkish Straits, this study suggests that such 
cases are not only national problems, but they have a universal nature 
which requires international cooperation.
ÖZET
Bugün çevre sorunları, endüstriyel ve teknik gelişim sonucunda 
evrensel bir hal almıştır. Bu gerçek, çevre bilincini ulusal ve uluslararası 
düzeye taşımış ve hemen hemen her ülke kendi çevre politikalarını 
geliştirmeye başlamıştır.
Çevre facialarının milli sınırları aşması, bu faciaların sonuçlarının 
ancak etki altındaki ülkelerin birliği içerisinde çözüm bulabileceği 
gerçeğini gündeme getirmiştir. Tankerlerin ve tanker kazalarının veya 
atıklarının neden olduğu petrol kirlenmesinin ciddi sonuçları acı bir 
gerçektir. Uzun yıllardır Boğazlar'da meydana gelen kazalar, Türkiye'nin 
stratejik önem unsurlarından birini oluşturan Boğazlarımız'ın çevresel 
açıdan açık bir tehlikede olduğunu ortaya koymuş ve Boğazlar trafiğinde 
teknik ve hukuksal düzenlemelere acilen ihtiyaç olduğunu bir kez daha 
gözler önüne sermiştir.
Bu çalışmanın amacı, konunun önemini ve ciddiyetini 
vurgulayarak. Boğazlar örneğiyle çevre konularında alınan önlemlerin 
güvenlik sorunu olmanın ötesinde ancak uluslararası işbirliğiyle 
çözümlenebilecek evrensel ekolojik sorunlar olduğunu ortaya koymaktır.
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The appearance of many global environmental issues which have 
attracted the attention of the media and popular opinion have given 
environmental politics a new status in world politics. Throughout the 
industrialized world, the environment is no longer perceived as merely a 
scientific and technical issue but as one of those central issues in world 
politics. This growing international concern about the environment has 
not occurred accidentally. Disastrous events have caused some regional 
pollution cases which have transpassed national boundaries.
This international concern is a response to the fact that the major 
components of the biosphere, including the atmosphere, the oceans and 
seas, soil cover, the climate system and the range of animal and plant 
species have all been altered by the intensity of human exploitation of the 
earth's resources in the twentieth century. (1)
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The most tragic reality is that the costs and risks of these activities 
to future generations will be much higher than they are to the world's 
current population. Thus, in the past decade, the scientific understanding 
of global environmental issues has been greatly enhanced. The number 
of environmental groups and activities have also increased. The 
realization that environmental threats can have serious socioeconomic 
and human costs and that they cannot be solved by unilateral decisions 
of states has necessitated international cooperation over environmental 
protection.
As a result, a strong struggle over environmental issues has 
started among nation-states with diverse political and economic interests. 
Some states oppose and some support environmental activities. 
However today, almost all states have accepted the reality that 
environmental issues are global and the states' involvement will continue 
to grow. (2)
This thesis aims to stress the importance and the seriousness of 
this issue; thus to show that the precautions that are taken are not only 
for security purposes but also for ecological protection. By an analysis of 
the· case of the Turkish Straits, this study suggests that such cases are 
not only national problems, but they have a universal nature which 
requires international cooperation.
The concern for the environment in Turkey is also increasing day 
by day. Turkey has begun to take her place in environmental 
discussions. Especially the recent accident of the two oil tankers in the 
Bosphorus that occurred in 13 March 1994 caused a very dangerous oil 
pollution in the Bosphorus and alarmed the Turkish environmentalists.
The Turkish Straits have experienced such accidents many times. 
The statistics show that between the years 1952-1992, there have been 
332 ship and tanker accidents in the Straits. The significance of this 
number cannot be underestimated. Consequently, the recent tanker 
accident aroused discussions on the regime of the Turkish Straits. Some 
environmental experts say that the entrance of the oil tankers to the 
Straits should be totally restricted and some others share the view that
the Montreux Convention and the Lausanne Treaty should be abolished 
or revised. The Turkish authorities say that the Turkish Straits have*c
become the most dangerous straits of the world because of the entering 
tankers and ships which carry dangerous chemicals.
For many years, the authorities and experts have brought the case 
into discussion in international scientific meetings and tried to attract 
attention to the seriousness of this issue. However, these have not found 
voice until the Straits have become the arena of a series of accidents. 
Thus the subject has gained popularity very recently and has become 
one of the most popular and debated subjects of the Turkish 
environmentalists and government authorities.
This study hopes to demonstrate that although environmental 
protection concerns may restrict economic activities of states and create 
international disputes in the short run, they will serve the common interest 
of all concerned in the long run. The Turkish Straits is a good case in 
point: regardless of the short-term disputes which have recently clouded 
the relations of Turkey with neighboring countries, a more restrictive 
policy over passage through the Straits would help reduce marine 
pollution and costly accidents, and thus would benefit all parties.
The thesis starts with a description of the historical evolution of the 
Straits policy to illuminate the possible foreign policy disputes which may 
arise from restrictions over rights of passage. The second chapter 
provides this historical background; in order to evaluate today's problems
regarding the Turkish Straits it is necessary to know the importance of the 
^tra its in Turkey's relations with its neighbors.
Due to the rapid increase in the magnitude of maritime transport of 
oil, the extent of marine pollution by oil tankers has increased gradually 
by time and marine pollution through vessels has become a phenomenon 
which deserves international attention. In this respect the third chapter 
examines the tankers and oil pollution within an environmental framework 
in order to enlighten the seriousness of this issue while evaluating the 
causes and consequences of the accidents in the Straits.
It is important to understand the problems of cooperation in the 
international political arena to reach a healthy solution in cases such as 
the Turkish Straits. For that reason the fourth chapter inspects the 
difficulties involved in cooperation efforts and gives some conditions for 
successful international environmental cooperation with a record of 
legislation over marine pollution.
The fourth chapter examines and evaluates all the discussions on the 
Turkish Straits and the effects of protectionist activities on Turkish Foreign 
Policy, with a view to understanding the generalizability of such relationships 
to similar cases in other countries. This work illustrates the gradual 
development of such cases into what we may call "global environmental 
politics".
CHAPTER II. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE STRAITS 
QUESTION
"Whether as refugees or as sea paths for his ships, straits have 
ever attracted the profit-seeking eyes of man. Since Mediterranean men 
first ventured across the salt water for trade or piracy, the Bosphorus and 
the Dardanelles have been a magnet to merchants, pirates, conquerors 
and statesmen". (1)
When their geographical locations are concerned, the Turkish 
Straits are one of the most important waterways of the world. In 
international relations the expression "The Straits" reminds directly the 
Turkish Straits. Even this point is enough to show the international 
importance of the Straits. In this region, not only the economic and 
commercial but also the political and strategic interests of the European 
countries coincide. (2)
Until 1700 the Straits were a superiority for the Ottoman Empire 
rather than being a problem. Until this date Ottomans were exercising 
exclusive jurisdiction over the waters of the Black Sea and the Straits. 
However, after the Russian entrance to the Black Sea, the Straits 
question began to evolve as an international issue. In recognition of this 
point the early phases of the historical study of this thesis begins from the 
year 1700.
The first phase of the Straits question begins with the Russian 
occupation of the town Azov on the Sea of Azov and their demand from 
the Ottomans that the Black Sea be opened to Russian Commerce which 
was rejected by the Ottoman Sultan. From this date on, Russia kept an 
eye on the Straits and the question began to evolve. (3)
Russians had always been the major party concerned in the 
question of the Straits. Especially between 1908 and 1914, there had 
been a series of Russian activities regarding the Turkish Straits. During 
this period, Russians tried to develop several plans to get hold of the 
Straits, but all of these had failed.(4)
The First World War emphasized the military and strategic 
importance of the Straits and this region had gained an international 
status.(S) At the end of this war, the necessity of an international regime 
for the Straits was emerged as capitulations were abolished during the 
war. (6) Thus the Treaty of Sèvres was signed on August 10, 1920, with 
severe terms.(7) However, the new Turkish Government which was 
established in Ankara on April 23, 1920, well paved the road of Lausanne 
by putting forth their power in Chanak between September and October 
1922.(8)
2.1 Early Phases: From 1700 to the Conference of Lausanne (1922)
The major agreements which prepared today's status of the 
Turkish Straits were the Treaty of Lausanne and the Montreux 
Convention.
The Conference of Lausanne marked the triumph of the Turkish 
Nationalists, and it was faced with very difficult and complicated 
problems. Three basic theses regarding the Turkish Straits were 
presented at Lausanne. First was the British position, designed to 
preserve the freedom of the ancient waterway under an international 
regime; second was the Turkish project, insuring Turkish sovereignty over 
the Straits, but providing a restricted freedom and the third was the Soviet 
plan, insisting on Turkish sovereignty, but closing the Straits to warships, 
and preserving the Black Sea as a Soviet mare clausum. (9)
The Peace Conference was held from November 20, 1922, to 
February 4, 1923, and again from April 23 to July 24, 1923, when the 
Peace Treaty was signed. The Conference marked a definitive end to the 
process of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of 
Lausanne, in reality, was the last of the great post- World War I treaties 
and it also carried the distinction of being the instrument which gave 
international recognition to the present status of Turkey. The territorial 
provisions of the treaty have remained valid to the present day, except 
İskenderun which was added in 1939 to the national territory.
2.2 The Conference of Lausanne (1922-23)
"On Turkey's European border, the Lausanne Treaty 
restored to Turkey Edime's railroad station on the 
western bank of the Meriç. In the Aegean, Greece kept 
all of the islands, except İmroz and Bozcaada, although
Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaha were to be 
demilitarized. The Dodecanese Islands and Rhodes 
were finally ceded to Italy, together with the small island 
of Meis. Turkey renounced her rights to all Arab lands 
and to Cyprus; the Mesopotamian border remained 
undecided until the Mousul area was finally allotted to 
British-mandated Iraq. The Western powers agreed to 
the complete abolition of the capitulations". (10)
The Lausanne Conference provided that the Greeks in Turkey 
were to be exchanged for the Turks in Greece. Only the Greeks who 
settled in Constantinople and the surrounding area, (including the islands 
of İmroz and Bozcaada) before October 30, 1918, and the Turks of 
Western Thrace were expressly exempted from this compulsory 
exchange. Within the next few years, about one and one-third million 
Greeks left Anatolia and more than one-half million Muslims were settled 
in Turkey.
The Lausanne Convention of the Straits, signed on July 24, 1923, 
was composed of twenty articles, with an Annex to Article 2, which laid 
down the rules concerning passage of commercial and war vessels and 
aircraft throughout the region of the Straits. Article 1 stated: "The High 
Contracting Parties agree to recognize and declare the principle of 
freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and air in the Straits of the 
Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, hereinafter 
comprised under the general term of the 'Straits' ".(11)
The first section of the Annex dealt with merchant ships, hospital 
ships, yachts, fishing vessels and nonmilitary aircraft. In time of peace, 
there was to be complete freedom of navigation to all flags. During war 
time and if Turkey was neutral, there was again to be complete freedom. 
In the case of Turkey being a belligerent, there was to be freedom of 
navigation for neutral vessels and nonmilitary aircraft.
The second section dealt with warships. In time of peace, 
warships were given complete freedom except those which are most 
powerful of the Black Sea States. Turkey had no responsibility for the 
number of warships passing through the Straits. In time of war, Turkey 
being neutral, there was to be complete freedom for warships. But 
warships and aircraft of belligerents were to take no hostile acts within 
the Straits. During war time, Turkey being a belligerent, neutral warships 
were to enjoy complete freedom. Submarines were to pass only on the 
surface, and strict rules were laid down for military aircraft. Warships in 
transit were not to remain longer than the time necessary for passage.
Special provisions covered sanitary measures. Warships which 
had cases of cholera, plague or typhus during the prior seven days or 
which had left an infected port in less than five days had to go through 
quarantine. A similar provision also applied to merchant vessels. 
Warships and commercial vessels calling at a port in the zone of the 
Straits were subject to the international sanitary regulations.
The demilitarized zones of the Straits included the Gallipoli 
peninsula, the Asiatic and European shares of the Dardanelles, the
Bosphorus, and the Sea of Marmara, running about seventy-five miles 
along the shores of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara, to a depth 
of some fifteen miles. No permanent fortifications, artillery organization, 
submarine engine of war, military air base, or naval base was to be 
permitted in the demilitarized zones, subject to the exception that a 
garrison of 12,000 could be maintained at İstanbul and a naval base and 
arsenal could be constructed there.
An International Commission of the Straits was established at 
Istanbul to implement the principle of freedom of the Straits. This 
commission was composed of one representative each of Turkey 
(president), France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Rumania, Soviet 
Russia and Yugoslavia. The United States was to be entitled to 
representation on accession. The Commission was to give an annual 
report to the League of Nations, to implement the provisions relative to 
warships and military aircraft, and "to prescribe such regulations" as 
might "be necessary for the accomplishment of its task". But the 
convention was not "to infringe the right of Turkey to move her fleet freely 
in Turkish waters". (12)
In order to assure the demilitarization of the region without danger 
to Turkey or to the freedom of the Straits, the Powers provided Article 18 
which says that in case of violation of the regulations regarding the 
demilitarized zones, in case of an attack, war or a threat of war, the high 
contracting parties, and in any case, France, Great Britain, Italy and 
Japan, acting in conjunction, will meet such violation by all means that 
the Council of League of Nations may decide for this purpose. (13)
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The Turkish Government accepted the Lausanne Convention of 
the Straits despite its misgivings as to security. The Convention was to 
endure until replaced, on July 20, 1936, by the Montreux Convention of 
the Straits.
2.3 The Conference of Montreux (1936)
The Turkish Government, although it had gained a very substantial 
victory at Lausanne, was not too happy with the international regime of 
the Straits, especially provisions concerning the international zone of the 
Straits and its security. After 1931, the breakdown of confidence in the 
collective security guarantee of the League of Nations, made the protests 
of Turkey against the Lausanne Convention, distinct. In 1936, due to the 
failure of the League's security system, Turkey urged that the Lausanne 
convention be replaced by a more acceptable agreement.
Meanwhile, Turkey had become a stabilizing element in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Its friendship with the USSR 
dated from 1921 and 1925. On July 18, 1932, Turkey became a member 
of the League of Nations and helped to pave the way for Soviet 
membership on September 18, 1934. Turkey and Greece had signed an 
important treaty on October 30, 1930, and solidified their friendship on 
Sejitember 14, 1933, and the two countries which had taken the leading 
role in the Balkan Conferences since 1930, joined with Yugoslavia and 
Rumania to establish the Balkan Entente on February 9, 1934. Like 
many other states in the immediate neighborhood of the Soviet Union,
11
Turkey signed a non-aggression agreement with USSR on July 1933. On 
March 7, 1931, Turkey and the Soviet Union added a naval supplement 
to the agreement of 1925 (renewed on December 17, 1929), which 
provided that neither would lay down any naval fighting unit for the 
purpose of strengthening its fleet in the Black Sea or in neighboring seas. 
This agreement was renewed subsequently on November 7,1945. (14)
British, Turkish and Soviet interests again clashed during the 
negotiations at Montreux. The Soviet Union wanted all warships to be 
excluded from the Black Sea, whereas Turkey's ambition was to regain 
the control over the Straits area and end its demilitarization. Like the 
Lausanne Convention, the Montreux Convention recognized and affirmed 
"the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits", 
which was to "continue without limit of time" but other articles of the 
Convention were to remain in force for twenty years.
According to the Convention, in peace time, merchant ships were 
to enjoy complete freedom, although they were subject to sanitary 
regulations. In war time, Turkey being non-belligerent, merchant ships 
under any flag and cargo were to enjoy complete freedom. If Turkey were 
to be a belligerent, merchant ships of friendly powers, which did not have 
the intention to assist the enemy, were to enjoy freedom of transit and 
navigation. Moreover, such vessels were to enter the Straits day by day 
and to travel a route indicated by the Turkish authorities. Similar 
provisions were to apply if Turkey considered itself in an imminent danger 
of war. (15)
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In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and 
auxiliary vessels (which are nevertheless subject to the notification clause 
and certain other restrictions), enjoy the right of transit to and through the 
Straits under special conditions. Black Sea powers were allowed to send 
warships of any size through the Straits, provided they pass through the 
Straits individually, escorted by not more than two destroyers. On the 
other hand, non-Black Sea powers are not permitted to send through 
naval vessels with greater tonnage than the maximum permissible 15,000 
tons; however warships visiting a port in the Straits are not to be included 
in the maximum tonnage. However, the Conference, finally adopted a 
solution for the tonnage of warships of non-Black Sea powers permitted 
entry into that sea. Accordingly, the Convention provided that the 
aggregate tonnage of non-riparian warships in the Black Sea should not 
exceed 30,000 tons in peace time. If at any time the tonnage of the 
strongest navy of a Black Sea power (the Soviets) should exceed by at 
least 10,000 tons its tonnage at the time of the signature of the 
Convention, the aggregate tonnage of non-Black Sea powers could then 
be increased to a maximum of 45,000 tons.
There had been some other detailed provisions concerning the 
navigation of warships inserted to the Convention. Briefly, non-Black Sea 
naval vessels were not to stay in the Black Sea longer than 21 days; 
transit of warships was to be preceded by notification to the Turkish 
government 8 to 15 days before entry into the Straits; submarines were 
generally forbidden passage, except that newly constructed or repaired 
submarines of Black Sea powers were allowed to pass on the surface in
13
the daytime; finally, vessels of war in transit through the Straits were not 
permitted to make use of any aircraft which they carried. (16)
By the Montreux Convention, the functions of the International 
Commission of Lausanne were transferred to the government of Turkey. 
Turkey was also authorized to fortify the Straits area, a right of which she 
made immediate use. The Turkish government was also empowered to 
collect statistics and information concerning the passage of all foreign 
warships in the Black Sea of riparian and non-riparian powers.
The Montreux Convention of 1936 has regulated the Turkish 
Straits for the past 50 or more years to the satisfaction of most states. In 
recent years, however, its provisions have been found to be, inter alia, 
increasingly unsatisfactory from the perspective of safety at sea, the 
preservation of freedom of navigation, and the protection of the 
environment. The Convention was prepared in accordance with 1936's 
technology.
However both the size and the weight of the vessels have changed 
and the traffic has increased very much. It is also expected that by the 
new channels which connect the Danube to the Baltic Sea, the traffic will 
increase more and more. There is also another possibility that the 
transportation of the Central Asian Oil may be done through the Straits to 
the Mediterranean. In this case, the crowded traffic will block the 
passage of vessels through the Straits.
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Thus, the discussion on the Montreux Convention is growing day 
by day with the increasing accidents that have been occurring in the 
Straits since 1960 as a result of the traffic. The next chapter covers the 
oil pollution caused by the tanker accidents and the increasing traffic and 
will give the reasons of the discussions on the Montreux Convention 
which has proven to be unsatisfactory for today's technology and 
environmental concerns.
15
The fact that maritime transport is causing severe impacts on 
regional marine environment is accepted world wide. Especially the 
transportation of oil (crude and other such products), but also of other 
products such as chemicals is significantly affecting regional waters.
The protection of the marine environment against oil pollution has 
now taken its place amongst a number of environmental concerns such 
as radioactivity, acid rain and discharges of heavy metals and other toxic 
chemicals. Nevertheless, oil pollution from both accidental spillage at 
sea and as a result of deliberate operational discharges, remains a major 
source of environmental pollution. (1)
There are many kinds of water pollution such as; silting of streams, 
the usage of waterways as dumps for household and industrial wastes. 
Some communities dump untreated sewage and garbage into the nearest 
streams. Industries contaminate the waterways when they discharge 
acids, chemicals, greases, oils and organic matter into them. Such 
materials foul drinking water and endanger public health. They destroy 
commercial fisheries. They also make waterways unusable for
recreational purposes. Leaks and spills from offshore oil wells and 
wrecked or damaged oil tankers have caused the widespread destruction 
of marine life. (2)
This chapter examines the tankers and the oil pollution caused by 
the oil spills and in this respect the Turkish Straits after the recent tanker
CHAPTER III. OIL POLLUTION: AN ECOLOGICAL THREAT
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accident in the Bosphoms which has been considered the last but not the 
least.
3.1 Tankers and Oil Spills
During the Second World War, in 1945, the sea transportation of 
oil was developed and it was reported that this kind of transportation is 
more economical than railway transportation. This situation alarmed the 
railway transportation companies who did not want to compete with oil 
transportation. At the same time, the environmentalists were also 
alarmed for this new kind of transportation was going to pollute the 
waterways, seas and oceans. Thus both from economic and 
environmentalist aspects, the transportation of oil caused disputes even 
at that time. Increasing oil transportation caused an increase both in the 
number and in the size of the oil tankers. One of the major factors that 
affected the result of the Second World War was the transportation of oil 
from producing countries in the Western Hemisphere to the war fields. (3)
Oil was first carried as a cargo in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century and from this time there has been an enormous growth in the 
transport of oil by sea and incidents of oil pollution have brought a 
growing awareness as an environmental problem requiring international 
control. (4) The global transportation of oil cargoes has led to a demand 
for increased control and international legislation to combat accidental 
and operational discharges of oily wastes and residues at sea. Oil 
pollution, following an incident, is publicly watched through the media by 
aroused populations, thus creating a social empathy. However, there are
17
sortie other facts about the sea transport of oil which the public generally 
does not see. V
It has been decided that marine pollution is induced by urban 
settlements and industrial installations established in coastal strips, pipe­
lines and platforms, atmospheric transport and maritime vessels. 
Pollution by maritime vessels occurs mainly in two ways; incidental 
pollution due to accidents and pollution caused by intentional or non- 
intentional actions. Substances which are released during maritime 
activities causing marine pollution can be grouped into five in accordance 
with international agreements and legislation relevant to prevention of 
marine pollution. These are; oil, toxic liquids, packed hazardous material, 
sewage and solid wastes. (5) Thus oil pollution caused by marine 
transport leads the first place among other kinds of marine pollution (See 
Table 1). There are various ways by which oil can enter the sea and 
cause pollution:
"-from oil fields under the sea, either by natural seepage, 
or off-shore oil production operations where failure or 
faulty operation of oil drilling rigs and ships can and does 
occur;
-from marine casualties such as stranding, foundering 
and collisions of tankers and vessels other than tankers 
which carry oil as cargo or fuel;
-from tanker operations where oil is discharged as a 
result of tank cleaning procedures and de-ballasting 
operations;
18
TABLE 1
Marine Pollution (Sea and Air) arising from Marine Transport
Possible Pollution caused by the Vessels
Operation Cargo
Residues ' Liquid Compact
from Garbage Sewage Air Other Cargo Cargo
Fuel/Oil Pollutants Pollutant. Residues Residues
-Sludae -Domestic -Seotic -Emmisions -Antifoulina -Ballast -Residues
from fuel and kitchen sewaae from paint water and of drv bulk
separation oarbaae from toilets funnel.e.Q. tank carao
residues and/or C 02 , SOa, -"Scrubber" washina
-Oilv water from food. sanitary NOx, CO, discharge water -Damaoed
from bilges packing section. HC, Soot from from crude aoods
(mixture of material. drenage inertgas oil and
fuel, luboil, glass from -Emmision production petroleum -Sweepinos
sea water; (bottle). sections of halón of tankers product from carao
conden. 
water, etc.)
etc. containing 
live stock -Emission
tankers holds
Ooerational (animals). of Hvdro- -Tank -Dunnaae
-Waste oil residues. carbon washina wood.
•contamin. cleaning -Grey originationg water separation
fuel rags, paint sewaae from liquid from materiai.et
•used luboil residues. water bulk cargo tankers c
contamin. rust. from carrying
with metal sweepings. galleys. -Emmision chemicals
abrasion. used bathrooms. of FCKWs
sea water. filtres,etc. laundry -water
etc. room (if not containina
mixed with residues
septic after
sewage) washing of 
dry bulk 
carrying 
vessels
Source : Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs
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-from vessels other than tankers whilst ballasting and 
cleaning fuel tanks and the discharge of this ballast and 
washings, and also, from all ships, the disposal of oil fuel 
residues and oily bilge;
-from oil terminal operations where oil can be spilled 
whilst loading and unloading cargo and the bunkering of 
all types of ships; this includes whilst vessels are 
alongside the jetties or moored to an off-shore buoy 
terminal;
-from operations in transferring oil from one tanker to 
another, such as in the case of the lightening of very 
large crude carriers;
-from land sources such as discarded lubricants and 
other liquid hydrocarbons;
-from hydrocarbon fallout from the atmosphere."(6)
When a highly refined oil is poured on a clean water surface, the 
oil forms a lens with a thickness that depends on the oil type. The 
spreading rate will depend on air and sea temperature, wind and sea 
currents, as well as the type of oil. When a crude oil is poured on pure 
water and the quantity is small, the oil quickly spreads out to a very thin 
film. Spreading is aided by the surface-active agents which crude oils 
contain. When larger quantities are spilled, this thinness occurs at the 
edge, but the rest of the oil forms a thin lens. If the water surface is 
heavily contaminated, then the final thickness may be 1 mm or more. (7)
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In 1945, sea tankers were relatively small when compared with 
34000 DTW (deadweight tonnage) VLCC (very large crude carriers) and 
540000 DTW and even larger ULCCs (ultra large crude carriers). Late 
60s and early 70s were the years which the production of the super 
tonnage tankers had increased by the growing dependence on oil. At the 
end of 1975, there were 3674 big tankers in the world. The managing 
companies were saying that this kind of big tankers were much safer and 
economical, compared to smaller ones. However these big tankers, 
although they had the ability to carry more oil than the small ones, did not 
stop the production of small tankers, as it was more feasible to use small 
ones in smaller channels and shorter distances. One VLCC tanker 
requires 22 meters of sea depth when it is totally full and there are not 
many ports which meets this requirement. Thus VLCCs anchor as close 
as possible and the oil is carried to the port by a system which is called 
"SPM" (Single Point Mooring Systems); oil is pumped from the tanker to a 
pipe which is settled under the sea and carried to the port. This system is 
dangerous in cases of a storm as the tanker may depart from the port and 
separate from the pipe. (8)
In any one year, ships transport some 1500 million tons of oil 
worldwide. According to the American National Academy of Sciences, 
pollution from shipping in 1989 was about 600 000 tons. More 
specifically, in European waters, there are 3450 vessels at sea on any 
day between Suez and Murmansk. 407 of these are tankers, 59 of them 
are over 20 years old. In 1987, a Dutch study demonstrated 19 000 tons 
of oil was spilt due to collisions of tankers and 57 000 tons due to tankers 
sinking. Accidents related to tankers are monitored by IMO (International
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Maritime Organization). Its statistics show that tanker incidents have 
been declining and that the industry halved the number and magnitude of 
tanker spills in the 1980s compared with the 1970s. There are however, 
signs that this record is reversing. An aging fleet more prone to 
breakdown, weaknesses in the shipping management structure, the 
reduction in crew numbers, the decline in competence led by cost-cutting 
imperatives and the non-availability of emergency towage and salvage 
facilities to assist with emergencies are the major indicators that make the 
working groups on port and shipping management strongly feel that the 
level of risk of a major incident happening again is too high. (9)
Looking at the 1992 statistics of import and export activities of oil, 
we can see that the amount of oil imported per day is 32.590.000 barrels 
(1 barrel is 159 liters). 24.1% of this amount was imported by the U.S.A., 
31.4% by OECD Europe, 16.2% by Latin America, 8.5% by North Africa, 
7.5% by West Africa, 7.5% by non-OECD members of Europe and China, 
5.5% by Asia (Except China and Japan), 3.3% by Canada, 2.9% by 
U.S.A., and 7.7% by other countries. (10) Regarding the world map, 
these numbers are good indicators of the frequency of oil transportation 
traffic in the world seas.
The environmental problems caused by the utilization and 
transportation of oil are not limited with the Bosphorus. Mediterranean is 
also a main road in the transportation of oil. In this sea, 260-350 million 
tons of oil is being carried and this amount makes up 1/6 of the total 
transportation of oil in the world. Apart from the accidents, the 
Mediterranean is being polluted by the spilling of 330 thousand tons of
2 2
oil. Theoretically, there should not be any spillage to the sea during oil 
transportation. In the world, the utilization of oil is in the highest rates. At 
any given time, oil tankers in the same size or larger than Nassia are 
sailing and carrying tons of oil in our seas. All the operations concerning 
oil, beginning from its discovery, production, transportation, refinement 
and its consumption cause the pollution of air, soil and water. Oil is a 
product with advantages and disadvantages at the same rate. The dark 
face of this black gold is that, it pollutes the environment at the highest 
rates and as we keep on depending on this product, pollution will 
continue. (11)
The spillage of oil and other noxious substances into the marine 
environment may have severe effects on the health, economic and social 
welfare of people residing on or near the shore as well as those who earn 
their living from the sea. Since the movement of such substances has no 
respect for political boundaries, it is the responsibility of all people with 
an involvement or interest in the waters where such spills occur, to 
cooperate as closely as possible in cleaning up the spill and eliminating 
any deleterious effects resulting from it.(12) Therefore, the Marmara 
Region is a good example to this kind of definition of oil pollution as not 
only the sea is polluted by the accidents, oil spillages and the traffic but 
the population residing or near the shore is also endangered.
The date March 13, 1994 added another one to the chain of the 
more than 40 accidents that has happened since 1960. The recent 
tanker accident in the Straits is a good case in point to show both the
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damages of the oil pollution and the political attitude of Turkey in the 
international political arena.
3.2 Accidents in the Straits: Causes, Consequences and Required 
Regulations
The environmental danger and the threats caused by the 
increasing marine traffic in the Straits have once more appeared with the 
collision in the Turkish Straits on 13 March 1994 between the oil-laden 
tanker Nassia and the bulk carrier Shipbroker. In this accident, over 30 
men died or are missing (16 dead and 14 missing) (13) and this event has 
again focused attention on one of the world's busiest international straits. 
If we consider the reality that about 28,051 vessels in transit pass the 
Straits annually (14), the marine traffic in the Straits constitutes great 
risks for the ecology of the region which gave signals before with a chain 
of accidents since 1960s (15). These risks occur through the discharge 
of oil during the normal processes of the tankers and ships such as 
ballasting and tank cleaning, the legal and illegal discharge of oil by the 
tankers and the spillages of oil as a result of the accidents.
Geographically, the Turkish Straits comprise two straits 
(Bosphorus and Dardanelles) with an enclosed sea (the Marmara Sea) in 
between. The total navigable length is about 160 nautical miles. The 
Straits are too narrow for the normal navigation of the ships and they 
have the shape of circular channels which make the navigation 
dangerous besides its difficulty. The depth of the water is at minimum 19 
meters and the narrowest point of the Straits is 700 meters. There are
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also some shallow parts and small islands which increase the difficulty of 
navigation. The changes in the weather conditions and the frequency of 
foggy weather reduces the distance of vision to below 600-700 meters. 
(16)
There is apparently no particular difficulty in navigating the Sea of 
Marmara and to a lesser extent the Dardanelles. It is the Bosphorus with 
its abrupt and angular windings and strong current which is difficult if not 
dangerous to navigate. The current in the Bosphorus runs from the Black 
Sea to the Aegean at an average rate of 4 knots (opposite undercurrents 
also exist). However, rates of 7/8 knots are not uncommon at its 
narrowest points where its breadth is less than 750 meters.(17)
The external factors that affect the marine traffic in the Straits are  ^
also important factors which make the Straits an international 
phenomenon. One of these is the connection of the North Sea to the 
Black Sea through the Main-Danube channel, the Danube-Rhine channel 
and finally the Rotterdam-Kostence channel. The river and sea-going 
ships which will be coming from these channels reach the Mediterranean 
through the Straits. According to the reports of the Ministry of 
Transportation this situation will increase the marine traffic to 15.000 per 
year. (18)
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation 
has lost its important ports and it has only Novorsissk and Sochi ports left 
for transportation. Thus all the marine transportation of Russia is made 
through these two ports and naturally through the Turkish Straits.(19)
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The transportation of the Central Asian and Caucasian oil to the world 
market is also another issue which increased the diplomatic discussions 
between the Russian Federation and Turkey. Central Asian Republics 
look to the Straits as their principal means of access to international trade 
including the chief export route for their rich and still developing oil and 
gas reserves. (20)
The above mentioned reasons can explain the situation of the 
Straits in regard to its natural qualities and the reasons of the frequency 
of traffic. The recent disastrous accident attracted both national and 
international concerns as the level of pollution was at a very high rate. 
The tragic accident which happened on March 13, 1994, in the 
Bosphorus was not the last one in the history of the Turkish Straits. 
"Nassia", a tanker which was sailing under the flag of the Greek Republic 
of Cyprus, loaded the crude oil from Russia and in its destination to Italy, 
entered the Bosphorus. In the Bosphorus it crashed with "Ship Broker", a 
dry cargo tanker. "Ship Broker" burnt immediately and run aground. 
However, "Nassia" kept on burning with series of explosions for five days. 
Almost 30 people lost their lives or were missing. The marine life, birds 
and the sea itself were polluted extensively but the statistical amount of 
the pollution can not be obtained at the moment. The oil covered the 
water preventing oxygen access and polluting the environment intensely.
This accident is not the last but it was not the first either (See 
Table 2). According to the Istanbul Port Administration of the Ministry of 
Transportation's statistics, the number of the total accidents between 
1982-1994, is 127. The ones which polluted the region (both sea and the
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TABLE 2.
Frequency of the accidents in the Straits
VEAftS 1 fOFACODBrrS
1982 6
1983 4
1984 4
1985 4
1986 12
1987 7
1988 9
1989 9
1990 35
1991 16
1992 8
1993 10
1994 2
Source : Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs
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coast) are; first, the accident of the "Independente" which exploded after a 
collision on November 18, 1979 and more than 100.000 tons of oil were 
spilled to the sea and burnt for days. Secondly on October 28, 1988, the 
"Blue Star" was carrying ammonia when it collided; thus 1000 tons of 
ammonia were spread to the air and a threat of explosion emerged. The 
"Rebunion 14" and the "Bazias" collided in the Dardanelles and 15.000 
sheep with the "Rebunion 14" sank in this area. Following this third 
accident, the "Madonna Lily" and "Rebunion 18" accident was the fourth 
which happened on November 14, 1991. The "Rebunion 18" sank with 
20.000 sheep in the Dardanelles. On 29.03.1990, a tanker called Janbur 
and another vessel, Detungistan, collided and 2600 tons of gasoline were 
spilled into the sea. Between 1990-1993, 27 tankers over 10.000 G.R.T. 
had passed through the Straits, even though they were too heavy for 
navigation through this area. They created an incredible danger both for 
themselves and the region. (21)
Table 3 shows vessel traffic in the Turkish Straits between 1980- 
1991. It was also reported from the Istanbul Port Administration of 
Ministry of Transportation that 28.051 vessels passed through the Straits 
in 1993 (See Table 4). 4442 of these vessels were Turkish and 23.609 of 
these were sailing under several flags. In a more specific classification, 
only the number of tankers that passed through is 4908; 2971 of these 
tankers passed loaded and 1937 of these passed unloaded. Only for 
December 1993 the total of the vessels that passed through was 2278 
and 358 of these were tankers. When divided to 30 days the number of 
tankers that pass each day makes approximately 11-13 tankers. It is 
important to mention that this number is only for the tankers. Thus the
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TABLE 3.
Vessel Traffic Turkish Straits 
1980-1991
ro
CO
YEAR BosDhorus-Sbuth Bound Dardanelles-North Bound TOTAL
Nos. G.R.T. Nos. G.R.T. Nos. G.R.T.
1980 11.839 102.859.191 11.849 112.624.290 23.688 215.483.881
1981 12.320 106.009.392 12.298 112.968.528 24.618 218.977.920
1982 12.983 109.742.254 12.130 116.378.364 25.113 226.120.618
1983 12.767 115.128.593 12.565 125.047.618 25.332 240.176.211
1984 11.006 108.299.930 12.884 134.168.535 23.890 242.468.465
1985 14.271 129.305.580 ^ 11.650 133.419.411 25.921 262.724.991
1986 12.103 119.380.692 12.305 128.733.258 24.408 248.153.950
1987 11.557 127.607.974 12.685 135.761.472 24.242 263.369.446
1988 12.092 131.739.074 13.046 141.277.595 25.138 273.016.467
1989 11.805 137.088.767 13.508 145.628.241 25.313 282.717.008
1990 11.445 129.623.682 12.912 144.238.811 24.357 273.862.493
1991 12.085 113.590.063 11.880 113.160.023 23.965 226.750.086
Source : Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs
TABLE 4.
Vessel Traffic 1993
MONTHS
TOTAL
VESSELS FLAG CLASS WEIGHT
TANKERS
loaded/
unloaded
JANUARY 1887
277 T.R. 
1610 Other
360 Tankers 
1527 Other
15.518.012
G.R.T.
244 loaded 
116
unloaded
FEBRUARY 1873
295 T.R. 
1578 Other
329 Tankers 
1554 Other
14.371.480
G.R.T.
207 loaded 
122
unloaded
MARCH 2187
308 T.R. 
1879 Other
441 Tankers 
1746 Other
17.690.388
G.R.T.
261 loaded 
180
unloaded
APRIL . 2462
335 T.R. 
2177 Other
406 Tankers 
2051 Other
18.785.588
G.R.T.
244 loaded 
162
unloaded
MAY 2555
405 T.R. 
2150 Other
440 Tankers 
2155 Other
19.991.701
G.R.T.
263 loaded 
. 177 
unloaded
JUNE 2568
413 T.R. 
2153 Other
440 Tankers 
2128 Other
20.503.235
G.R.T.
262 loaded 
173
unloaded
JULY 2720
442 T.R. 
2278 Other
464 Tankers 
2236 Other
21.427.911
G.R.T.
277 loaded 
207
unloaded
AUGUST 2623
390 T.R. 
2233 Other
467 Tankers 
2156 Other
20.227.620
G.R.T.
268 loaded 
199
unloaded
SEPT. 2411
404 T.R.  ^
2007 Other
408 Tankers 
1993 Other
18.037.870
G.R.T.
237 loaded 
171
unloaded
OCTOBER 2406
401 T.R. 
2005 Other
403 Tankers 
2003 Other
18.630.895
G.R.T.
229 loaded 
174
unloaded
n o v e m b ; 2081
342 T.R. 
1739 Other
372 Tankers 
1709 Other
16.926.233
G.R.T.
216 loaded 
156
unloaded
DECEMBER 2278
430 T.R. 
1848 Other
358 Tankers 
1920 Other
16.055.591
G.R.T.
263 loaded 
95
unloaded
TOTAL 28.051
4442 T.R. 
23.609
4908
Tankers
23.143
Other
221.448.224
2971
loaded
1937
unloaded
Other G.R.T.
Source : Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs
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total amount of the vessels passing through the Straits per day is 
approximately 70-75. These numbers are enough to show the frequency 
of the traffic in the Straits.
According to the Montreux Convention, the information regarding 
the loading situation of the vessels depends on vessels' own declaration. 
Thus, Turkish authorities claim that they can not collect data and definite 
information on this matter. However they collect some data on the 
amount of the oil that is carried through the Straits (See Table 5). 
Depending on the G.R.T. and D.W.T. of the vessels, it is found that in 
1993, 75-80 million tons of crude oil and effluents were carried through 
the Straits. For the following years, it is expected that, if the Central 
Asian oil is to be carried through the Straits, 35.000.000 tons per year will 
be added to this amount. (22)
In recent years, two tankers, carrying dangerous chemicals, 
caused problems while they were passing through the Straits and 
although they declared that they would not do any ballasting in the Black 
Sea, some time after their departure some poisonous barrels were found 
and the Administration has started legal prosecutions on these two 
tankers. (23)
Thus the causes of the accidents, besides the factors mentioned 
before, can be explained by the refusal of the ships and the tankers to 
take pilotage, the abrupt, angular and strong windings, strong currents, 
fog, snow storm, rain and other natural events. Unfortunately there are 
some other factors that should be taken into account, such as captains'
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TABLE 5.
VESSEL TRAFFIC AND CARGO VOLUMES
1991
CON>
LOCATION
NUMBER
OF
VESSELS
CARGO HANDLED
DRY
BULK
tons
LIQUID
BULK
tons
BREAK
BULK
tons
CONTAINER
TEU
(tons)
TOTAL
tons
ISTANBUL
Haydarpaşa 2043 548931 1902584 959887 3411402
Sakpazan 511 0
Ambarlı 810 2401285 2401285
GULF OF 
İZMİT
6405 509240 15216426 7196282 22921948
GEMLİK 600 X X X 1230233
MUDANYA 462 153904 127242 48220 329366
BANDIRMA 1374 X X 10684 2423202
GELİBOLU 155 90000 90000
TEKİRDAĞ 964 X 2076779
SİLİVRİ 320 X 126000
TOTAL 13644 1302075 17744953 9147086 970571 35010215
NOTES: -Above information is based on information received from Harbor Masters and/or Terminal Operators. 
-Number of vessels for sand discharging terminals in Istanbul area are not included.
-Sakpazan handles passengers only.
lack of education, training and experience to drive their vessels or 
tankers in conditions where natural difficulties occur; and their 
misunderstandings of the announcements regarding navigation, the 
technical inefficiencies, and inadequacies of equipment in ships have 
caused accidents or problems in the Straits. In addition, the increase in 
the marine traffic, the lack of both the legislation and the administration, 
the shortcomings in the information exchange between the administration 
and the captains are other factors of the accidents that occur in the 
Straits. (24)
Oppositions to the Montreux Convention's unsatisfactory 
regulation first appeared after the "Independenta" accident which 
happened on November 18, 1979 as this accident was the first one which 
polluted the environment seriously. (25) However, these oppositions 
showed themselves publicly in 1987 as can be seen by a media analysis. 
The media were silent on this issue until 1987 but the following accidents 
awakened them and the Convention began to be questioned. Necati 
Doğru, a columnist of a popular daily, wrote that the 1936 Convention can 
not meet the needs of today's Straits with greatly increased frequency of 
traffic and the tonnage of the vessels. In his article he made a 
comparison between the Turkish Straits and the Rhine Straits which is 
half of the Turkish Straits in width. He wrote that by a strict control 
system and regulations, the Rhine Vessel Administration has prevented 
the occurrence of accidents and the same should be done in Turkey and 
the Montreux Convention should be revised. (26)
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The "Blue Star" accident which happened on October 28, 1988, 
once again started discussion over the Montreux Convention's ability to 
protect the Straits with a view to preventing other accidents' disastrous 
effects on the environment. In another article on October 1, 1991, M. 
Deniz Vank, who worked in the OECD Marine Transportation Secretariat 
between 1987-88 and was in office as the General Manager of the 
Marine Transportation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also 
mentioned the necessity of changes in the Montreux Convention for the 
safety of the Straits and the growing danger caused by the traffic. (27) 
Captain Engin Derinsu, who also worked in the OECD as the Turkish 
delegate, mentioned that the Bosphorus, with its environmental beauty is 
the jewelry of Turkey and İstanbul; thus, taking into consideration the 
accidents in the Straits, said that, the Bosphorus is in a great danger and 
a catastrophe may occur very soon if Turkey does not take any action 
regarding the Montreux Convention. (28)
These discussions on the requirement of new regulations for the 
protection of the Straits have continued until today. The increasing public 
concern and naturally the increasing traffic and accidents forced the 
Government of Turkey to take some measures. However, it is arguable 
whether the Government decided to take action as a result of increasing 
public opposition or prospect of the transportation of the Central Asian Oil 
through a pipe-line over the Turkish territory which will bring Turkey a 
high profit. (29)
In any case, prior to the collision of the 13 March 1994 and the 
subsequent loss of life, the Turkish authorities had already appreciated
34
that the Montreux Convention was no longer satisfactory for the 
maintenance of safety at sea, for freedom of navigation and for the 
protection of the environment. In her discussion on the 26 March 1993 
with the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), Turkey had already expressed her concern in 
respect of these issues. First, there was the steady increase in the 
nurhber of ships passing through the Straits and their size. Second, this 
steady increase in traffic has been mirrored by an increase in the number 
of casualties arising from the transit through the Straits. Third, the 
increase in casualties has affected Turkey's capacity to maintain freedom 
of transit and navigation. The essence of such freedom is that it is 
exercised and effected in safe conditions and that it is not subject to 
arbitrary suspension. Fourth, there was the danger to the physical safety 
and security of the City of Istanbul itself with its 10 million inhabitants. 
The response of Turkey to these challenges has been to initiate action at 
both national and international levels to enhance the safety of navigation. 
At the international level, a traffic separation scheme and traffic 
routing/lanes were submitted to the IMO and the concerns of the Turkish 
authorities over navigation in the Straits were shared by the IMO. The 
IMO made additional recommendations such as compulsory pilotage, 
limits on maximum vessel size, compulsory reporting and new radar 
coverage. On 23 November 1993 the Turkish Council of Ministers 
approved a regulation entitled "Maritime traffic regulations for the Turkish 
Straits and the Marmara region" (the Maritime Regulations) which was 
published in the Turkish Official Gazette on 11 January 1994. The 
purpose and the scope of the Maritime Regulations are specified to be 
the regulation of a "maritime traffic scheme in order to ensure the safety
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of navigation, life and property and to protect the environment" in the 
Straits. (30)
The principal provisions of the Maritime Regulations provide for 
the establishment of a traffic separation scheme in the Straits, navigation 
rules, notification procedures for vessels carrying dangerous cargo, traffic 
control centers and stations, speed controls, compulsory pilotage in case 
of breakdown, regulations on where towage is necessary and the 
suitability of the tows, temporary suspension of passage in special cases, 
and the right to refuse passage to large vessels and those carrying 
dangerous cargo or goods. The Maritime Regulations (See Appendix I) 
came into force on 1 July 1994. (31)
What made the Nassia accident so special is that, it had happened 
right after the recent "Maritime Regulations* which was ratified on 
January, 1994 and was put in force on July 1, 1994. This accident 
cannot be underestimated as it has been a great danger for the 
population living in Istanbul and the ecological system of the environment 
surrounding the Straits. There have been many speculations that there 
has not been any pollution in the sea. However, since the Stockholm 
Conference, the definition of sea pollution was given as "all kinds of direct 
and indirect pollution activities that will harm the alive sources, all actions 
that will affect the human health, fisheries and the quality of water". (32) 
Denial of the pollution effects of the accidents reflects the indifference to 
the destruction of the nature and of human health.
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The General Secretary of the Maritime Chamber of Commerce 
Prof.Dr. Reşat Özkan, in the panel of "Environment and the Security of 
Passage from the Straits" on July 30, 1994, said that the recent 
Regulations regarding the Straits do not contradict with the Montreux 
Convention and also added that the IMO will put the recent regulations 
into force on November 24, 1994, thus Turkey will be able to apply fines 
to those vessels that pass through although they do not conform to the 
identifications of the regulations. In the same panel, Istanbul Regional 
Manager of the Ministry of Transportation Altan Köseoğlu, supported 
Prof. Özkan and said that the said regulations will give Turkey the right to 
control the free passage and the vessels will be enforced to give 
information about their cargoes. (33)
The recent regulations were welcomed by the authorities in many 
aspects while leaving some of them with certain questions. The following 
chapter will describe the difficulties in international environmental 
cooperation efforts and the record of the legislation on marine pollution. 
Finally, the recent discussions and various perspectives concerning the 
regulation of the Straits will be presented.
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CHAPTER IV. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION AND THE RECORD OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGISLATION OVER MARINE POLLUTION
The environmental consequenœs of an economic activity of a 
transboundary scope can be defined as an international environmental 
issue. The totality of these issues creates the material of global 
environmental politics which involves threats to the integrity of the 
biosphere, planet's climate, atmosphere, land, oceans, seas, forests and 
genetic diversity.
These issues have created problems of cooperation in the 
international political arena as they require a concerted effort. These 
problems, although they may affect only some regions of the world, 
require extensive multilateral negotiations and international bargaining to 
maintain a solution. These requirements put the whole task of the 
solutions under an arduousness as they necessitate positive 
commitments by national governments and sustained coordination of 
their activities. In the total procedure of such agreements, a network of 
global environmental regimes which govern the state behaviour is 
necessary. Unfortunately, while cooperation may occur in certain areas, 
it may be elusive in others.
This chapter will examine the difficulties involved in international 
environmental cooperation efforts in general and the contemporary 
perspectives on the Straits Regime with the implications of related 
environmental concerns for Turkish Foreign Policy. Towards this end,
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first the conditions for successful international environmental cooperation 
are described. ,Then, the record of intenational cooperation over oil 
pollution is evaluated. Finally, the prospects for international cooperation 
over a new and more environmentally sound Straits Regime are 
discussed.
4.1 Difficulties Involved in Cooperation Efforts
There are some political and environmental forces that work to 
obscure the negotiation and implementation of rational environmental 
policy procedures between the states. The first concerns for 
environmental issues appeared in the 1960s and by the increasing 
interactions between economic development and ecological harm made 
these an international issue in the early 1970s. (1)
The beginning of the global environmental policy, as
environmental issues affected all nations, may be dated by the United 
Nations General Assembly's resolution of December 3, 1968, to convene 
a UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Before the 
Stockholm Conference, many multilateral agreements and declarations 
had been made but they were not foreseen in a broader environmental 
context. (2) The significance of these earlier agreements was that they 
prepared the basis for today's comprehensive treaties. (3)
The 1972 Stockholm Conference placed the question of 
environmental protection on the official agenda of international policy and 
law. Thus the status of the environment was promoted from "low" to
39
"high" politics. As a result, a system of institutions emerged to formulate 
international law on the environment and several conferences and 
treaties were made for international protection of the environment. The 
Stockholm Declaration of Principles had provided a rationale for 
international cooperation which was followed by general international 
cooperation efforts. (4) After 1972, over a hundred international 
environmental agreements were signed on a bilateral, regional, or global 
basis. UNEP's Register lists 152 multilateral agreements on 
environmental issues up until 1990s, of which 102 were concluded after 
1970. (5)
The Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) of 1992 was another important 
event in international environmental cooperation which brought 150 
nations, 1400 NGOs and 8000 journalists together. This event 
accomplished some agreements between governments, but its greater 
value lies in the fact that it has shaped the international agenda of the 
coming years: "It defined the new international values of equity and 
environment, linked them inseparably, and dramatized how powerfully 
they affect North-South relations".(6) Rio intensified or laid, several legal 
and quasi-legal bases for the development of international regimes 
intended to cope with the complex problems of environment and 
development. (7) Despite the difficulties involved in international 
cooperation, a global order of the environment is gradually emerging 
through the formation of regimes in major issue-areas.
4.1.1. Conditions for Successful International Environmental 
Cooperation
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In an analysis of the theoretical approaches regarding the 
formation of international regimes, it is found that they either emphasize 
factors that are irrelevant to environmental politics or are just for one type 
of global environmental regime. (8) These include the structural, game 
theoretic, institutional bargaining, and epistemic communities approach. 
The structural or hegemonic power approach holds that the primary factor 
determining regime formation and change is the relative strength of the 
nation-state actors involved in a particular issue and that stronger states 
in the issue system will dominate the weaker ones and determine the 
rules of the game. This approach suggests that strong international 
regimes are a function of the existence of a hegemonic state that can 
exercise leadership over weaker states and that the absence of such a 
hegemonic state is likely to frustrate regime formation. Another approach 
to regime creation is based on game theory and utilitarian models of 
bargaining and can be called the utilitarian approach. This approach 
suggests that small groups of states are more likely to be able to 
successfully negotiate an international regime than a large number 
because each player can be more readily understand the bargaining 
strategies of other players. However because of the importance of veto 
power in global environmental politics, relatively small groups of states 
are no more likely to be able to form regimes than much larger ones. A 
third approach, which has been called the institutional bargaining model 
of regime creation, hypothesizes that regime formation can be successful 
only if state actors are unclear about how their interests would be 
affected by any proposed international regime. The fourth approach is 
the epistemic communities model, which emphasizes international
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learning, primarily on the basis of scientific research on a given problem, 
as a factor of influencing the evolution of regimes.(9)
A theoretical approach should take into account the socio-political 
forces and economic relationships involved in the unique structure of 
each issue. States reflect their domestic economic interests and socio­
political balances that are the most crucial factors for the outcomes of 
global environmental bargaining. Besides these, the improvement in the 
scientific knowledge, the increasing proenvironmentalist public opinion 
and international prestige are the encouraging factors for the process of 
regime formation and strengthening.
In order to enlighten the problems of international cooperation we 
should take into account firstly the differences in nations' perceptions of 
an environmental threat. The reactions of the states differ in accordance 
with the actual costs and risks as they are not distributed equally among 
them. Some states are more and some are less motivated to cooperate. 
Depending on the geographical location of a country and its level of 
industrialization, the threat may necessitate an immediate response or 
the threat may appear in a long term.(10) States do not have the same 
perceptions of equitable solutions to environmental issues. For instance 
LDCs are concerned with their economic growth rather than their 
environment and they would like to use all their resources and 
possibilities to overcome poverty and underdevelopment despite negative 
environmental consequences.
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Domestic forces also influence international bargaining on 
environmental protection. Therefore in bargaining processes, the status 
of these forces in a country’s economy is very important. For instance, 
Turkey's insistence on protecting the Straits for environmental purposes, 
although they affect both the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, is not 
perceived positively by the Russian Federation as almost all their oil 
transportation is done through the Turkish Straits. (11)
The absence of public awareness over environmental issues and 
the lack of popular pressures make it easier for governments to escape or 
avoid international efforts on environmental cooperation. For instance, in 
LDCs the public is more concerned with economic growth or political 
issues rather than environment. However in developed countries, the 
history of environmentalist public actions and groups goes even back to 
the 1970s. In authoritarian regimes it is easier to escape from 
international environmental commitments as they have the power to 
suppress any opposition to their policies.
Some programs in international cooperation require advanced 
technology, skilled personnel, or capital to put the studies into practice. 
Thus, states may oppose such cooperation because of these reasons. It 
is relatively harder or expensive for those states to implement these 
cooperation processes.
Another important factor that obscures cooperation is the reality 
that the world political system is made up of autonomous nation-states 
and they are governed by the premises of exclusive national sovereignty.
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These factors show themselves by some special difficulties for the 
resolution of transnational environmental problems. Thus these words 
can explain this situation more clearly; "A single, complex and highly 
integrated ecosystem has to be managed within the constraints of a 
political system made up of over 170 states, each claiming sovereign 
authority within its territory. It is, moreover, a political system which has 
historically been prone to violent conflict and in which cooperation has 
been difficult to achieve". (12)
Also the inequalities in wealth and power among states is another 
important factor that prevents concerted action. The LDCs are suffering 
from over-population and hunger and in the short-run they are not 
considering the environmental problems a priority. Thus, they are using 
up their natural resources and environmental capital. On the other hand, 
the DCs do not intend to sacrifice their affluent lifestyles and profit- 
oriented market system for environmental purposes. Thus, in many 
cases they take into account their national interests. Within the present 
nation-state system, environmental diplomacy serves national interests. 
It should be considered that it is not a new branch of diplomacy, only the 
substance of it is recent. (13)
Finally, the success of environmental protection depends on its 
success on national level. It depends on national follow-up and 
implementation rates. Actually, in a world where there is a decentralized 
legal system, it depends on the consent of the states to cooperate in 
international environmental issues. Therefore, it can be said that the
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weakest point in environmental law and environmental regimes is the lack 
of implementation and enforcement.
4.2 International Legislation Concerning Oil Pollution
The impressive number of international agreements concerning oil 
pollution points to a considerable degree of international cooperation in 
this area (See Appendix II). The increasing oil pollution incidents have 
called for control through enforcement of international regulations. 
Changes in operating procedures and control of oil pollution at sea have 
been encouraged by the international ratification and enforcement of a 
series of conventions and protocols aimed at prevention. The first was 
instigated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1954, 
culminating on October 2, 1983 with the coming into force of the 
"International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships". This 
convention had initially been drawn up in 1973 by the Internationa! 
Conference on Marine Pollution. In 1978 a further protocol was adopted 
by the International Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution 
Prevention. This combined both safety and pollution control aspects into 
a single instrument, known as MARPOL 73/78 (14).
4.2.1 The role of the International Maritime Organization (iMO) and 
the progress of marine pollution legislation
I MO'S role has been to solve some technical problems for the 
implementation of the conventions on various maritime safety and marine 
pollution control. This role involved the organization of regular
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international meetings on tanker safety and pollution prevention. In 
dealing with several components of the conventions, I MO formed plenary 
committees and a number of sub-committees and technical committees 
where Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) also participated. For instance, special 
working groups consisting of members from several maritime nations and 
observers from the tanker companies, prepared guidelines and test 
specifications for pollution monitoring and control systems. These were 
then passed to the plenary meeting in the form of Resolutions, for 
approval and adoption.(15)
The I MO must ensure safety of shipping and prevention of vessel- 
source pollution, and has taken a broad view of the definition of "vessel", 
including hovercrafts, mobile and non-mobile offshore oil platforms. It 
can act through a variety of organs and has expanded these to meet the 
new needs of environment protection. It has concluded a large number of 
Conventions and Codes, which it continues to revise and augment in 
order to enhance environment protection. IMO provides a vital forum for 
resolving regulatory conflicts between the flag states and their 
shipowners, who generally seek to preserve maximum freedom for their 
vessels, and coastal states, which emphasize protection of their 
environment. Developmental issues work both ways here, since though a 
decade ago developed states were numbered among the major flag 
states, and these, though often also coastal states, gave priority to their 
merchant shipping interests, now many more developing states have 
inaugurated extensive registries. This does not, however, necessarily 
mean that they have weaker regulations, since they have realized, in the
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light of growing concern for environment protection, that to attract 
shipoyvners to register vessels under their flag they must give that flag 
respectability. This they can do by becoming parties to relevant I MO 
Conventions. (16)
4.2.2 International Convention for the Prevention of Poiiution of the 
Sea by Oil, 1954
The adoption of the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) in 1954 is one of the first examples 
of the efforts to limit marine oil pollution and it was held under the 
auspices of the British government (17). It came into force in 1958 and 
various Amendments were added in 1962 and 1969 which came into 
force in 1967 and 1978. The Convention was concerned essentially with 
the limitation of discharges in certain prohibited areas, e.g. within 50 
miles of land. Discharges within these regions were not to exceed 
lOOppm. Problems emerged due to the lack of adequate reception 
facilities, and there were indications that some larger vessels (e.g. 
greater than 20,000 tons) took advantage of a "special circumstances" 
clause which allowed them to discharge waste if it was not reasonable to 
retain it (on safety grounds). The 1969 Amendments incorporated the 
new procedures which were being adopted. For the first time, an 
instantaneous rate of discharge not exceeding 60 liters of oil per nautical 
mile was introduced as the discharge limit for a tanker proceeding en 
route. Also the total quantity of oil discharged on any ballast voyage was 
not to exceed 1/15,000 of the total cargo carrying capacity. Few 
operators at the time had installed monitoring and recording equipment,
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so any challenge could only be met by a detailed explanation of the 
events during a previous discharge. Few operators at the time had 
installed monitoring and recording equipment, so any allegation of an 
illegal discharge could only be met by a detailed examination of the 
circumstances being undertaken at the time of the alleged discharge. (18)
4.2.3 MARPOL 73/78
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973 was adopted to replace the revised OILPOL Convention. 
The 1973 MARPOL Convention on ship-generated pollution was 
sponsored by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It was also 
subsequently revised in 1978 in the Protocol adopted by the International 
Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention. These are now 
treated as a single unit-MARPOL 73/78. The 1978 Protocol also involved 
new structural requirements for tankers, as well as operational guidelines 
for the use of Crude Oil Washing (COW) and suitable designs for the use 
of Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBT) - with the intention of reducing 
pollution still further. MARPOL covers pollution by oil as well as the 
dumping of noxious liquid substances in bulk, harmful materials carried in 
bulk, and sewage and garbage generated on board. More stringent 
pollution standards were set for certain "special areas" which were 
particularly vulnerable to pollution (the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the 
Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Persian/Arabian Gulf). (19)
The 1973 Convention includes five Annexes;
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-Annex I
’A  \
-Annex li 
-Annex III
-Annex IV
-Annex V
Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Oil
Regulations for the Control of Pollution by 
Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk 
Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Harmful Substances carried by Sea in 
Packaged Forms, or in Freight Containers, 
Portable Tanks or Road and Rail Tank 
Wagons
Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Sewage from Ships
Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Garbage from Ships
Annex 1 which includes Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution 
by Oil entered into force on 2nd October 1983. It consists of 
requirements for monitoring, control and separation systems, although 
there is some discussions of the possibility of instrumentation and 
systems designed originally to control oil pollution also being used to 
measure the discharge of chemicals. The discharge requirements within 
Annex 1 are in several respects similar to those given in OILPOL 54/69, 
with the added requirement that tankers install an oil discharge 
monitoring and control system.
Enforcement and the application of fines for transgressors were 
difficult under OILPOL. But in MARPOL 73/78, with the advent of control 
instrumentation with recording facilities, and the requirement for
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certification of structures and fittings, the possibilities for a greater degree 
of enforcement have been increased. Nevertheless, it will generally be 
acknowledged that loopholes still exist for the more deceitful master to 
transgress without penalty. The improvement in surveillance techniques 
and vigilance by port and governmental authorities however has led to an 
increased number of successful prosecutions and fines. It is essential 
that the latter is of a magnitude to ensure that such fines act as an 
effective deterrent. The delay caused to the ship or tanker while such an 
action is in progress provides an incentive for legal compliance, as does 
the added threat of prohibition from a port or harbor for loading or 
discharge. (20)
With its 1978 amendments, MARPOL entered into force in 1983. It 
has been effective. While the total movement of oil by sea fell by 22 
percent the amount of oil lost into the oceans from spills fell by over 90 
percent, indicating some real international action in controlling oil 
pollution.(21)
Roughly 10 percent of marine pollution derives from ocean 
dumping. Roughly another 10 percent derives from operational 
discharges from shipping and offshore activities, leaving the 
overwhelming balance, about 80 percent of marine pollution inputs, 
coming from land-based sources. While there are global conventions 
concerning dumping (the LDC) and for operational discharges from 
shipping (MARPOL), both administered under the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), there are no global conventions or mechanisms in
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force to systematically address land-based sources, the main threat to 
the environment. (22)
Turkey has been a party to the said Convention as from 24.06.90 
on the basis of decree which is enforced by the Law No. 244, Articles 3 
and 5 and in force since 31.05.90; issued in Turkish Official Gazette No. 
20558 dated 24.06.90. The decree was adopted by the Turkish Cabinet 
on 03.05.90. This Convention is the only one which Turkey adopted up 
to now.
Other and examples of international cooperation over marine 
pollution are the following agreements;
-OPRC Convention which is the Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Co-operation Convention 1990 (OPRC) has not yet been 
adopted by Turkey. Actually, OPRC comprise regulations to 
enhance the impact of MARPOL 73/78 (notably the Annexes) 
primarily stipulates standards on ship operation, OPRC is 
mainly concerned with obligations to be met by the state.
-SOLAS 1974: Primarily intend to safeguard the health, safety 
and welfare of persons on board the vessel.
-Barcelona Convention 1976: Concerning maritime transport, 
the Barcelona Convention is the obsolete due to the impact 
and application of IMO-Conventions.
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-London Dumping Convention 1972; is more related to "land- 
base sources" than to maritime transport.
-Convention on Intervention on the High Seas 1969, and 
Protocol 1973; the right to intervene in maritime casualties is 
outlined in this Convention.
-UNEP Guidelines Concerning the Environment Related to 
Offshore Mining and Drilling within the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (Nairobi, 31 May 1982); to lay down basic 
standards for incorporation in national and regional rules, 
regulations, practices and procedures which will ensure that 
environmental considerations are effectively protected in 
national and international systems of authorization, 
environmental assessment, environmental monitoring, 
consideration of transfrontier impacts, safety measures, 
contingency planning, liability and compensation.
-United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego 
Bay, 10 December 1982); to set up a comprehensive new legal 
regime for the sea and oceans, including protection and 
preservation of the marine environment.
-UNEP Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment against Pollution from Land-based Sources 
(Montreal, 19 April 1985); to assist governments in the process 
of developing appropriate bilateral, regional and multilateral
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agreements and national legislation for the protection of the 
marine environment against pollution from land-base sources.
-International Convention on Salvage (London, 28 April 1989); 
to provide for uniform international rules regarding salvage 
operation in the light of the need for timely operations and to 
protect the environment.
-International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-operation (London, 29 November 1990); to 
prevent marine pollution by oil, to advance the adoption of 
adequate response measures in the event that oil pollution 
does occur, and to provide for mutual assistance and co­
operation between States for these aims. (23)
4.3 Prospects for International Cooperation over a New Straits 
Regime
Developments relating to the environment were experienced later 
and less intensively in Turkey than in the West. The reason for this is 
that industrialization and urbanization occurred later here with a 
consequent delay in the emergence of environmental problems.
The bureaucracy in Turkey has not acted with sufficient 
decisiveness and clarity on the subject of environmental policy owing to a 
prevalent view that protection of the environment will impede 
industrialization, and thus development of the country. Particularly
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following 1985, however, conœm for the environment is known to have 
increased and, in a more conscious approach, a positipn was taken 
against polluting agents.
News items relating to the environment are seen almost daily in 
the Turkish press today and some newspapers even have special pages 
reserved for the subject. (24) Radio and television programs on the 
environment are also produced, and the subject has also entered into 
advertising with a lot of attention being paid to environment-friendly 
detergents and the health safety of glass containers.
The discussions on the Montreux Convention had started long 
before the "Nassia" accident. As mentioned before, the "Independenta" 
accident opened the way for those discussions first. Afterwards other 
dangerous accidents helped to keep the discussions on the agenda. The 
main discussion has been the necessity to adapt the Convention to 
today's requirements or a total abolishment of the Convention.
Lawyer Engin Ural, the General Secretary of the Turkish 
Environment Foundation and who has written the first draft of the 
Environment Legislation, says in an article that in the basis of law, there 
is a principle that the agreements should be adapted to the changes in 
the world. He adds that if Turkey takes the first step to make some 
changes in the Convention, she can get what she wants by insistence. 
(25)
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Mr.Ural recommends that the Environmentalist NGOs can prepare 
a basis for Official Institutions such ^  .the Ministry of Environment and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through lobbying activities. According to 
Mr. Ural, such activities would give direction to Turkey's environmental 
and legislative actions. (26)
Although the new regulations are found too strict and objected 
internationally, nationally they are found lacking in many points, such as 
the following: the "pilotage" is not obligatory and the vessels which carry 
very dangerous cargoes such as radioactive matter, liquid gas, oil and 
other poisonous materials should be totally prohibited.(27) In discussions 
at the national level, the Lawyers of "İzmir Environmental Act" say that 
Istanbul is a national treasure and has national importance. Thus, the 
passage of the tankers with dangerous cargoes should be prohibited 
totally. (28)
Environmental pollution and the loss of natural resources are not 
phenomena restricted to certain parts of the world. These problems 
concern the world as a whole. The global nature of environmental 
problems denotes that their solution too is going to be global, and a path 
should be chosen which leads straight to collective action and 
international cooperation. The environmental question, that is, the 
destruction of natural resources, is a problem that affects the common 
future of all societies. Turkey too, therefore, has no choice but to deal 
with the problem on a global basis.
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In this respect, while dealing with the problems related to the 
Turkish Straits and the passage of oil tankers, Turkish authorities asked 
the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Marine Security 
Committee, their opinions on new regulations on the Straits. The 
discussions on this matter took 10 days and there appeared two blocks; 
one consisting of the Russian Federation, Greek Republic of Cyprus, 
Greece, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Rumania and Oman, the other was Turkey 
and the Western powers headed by the U.S.A (29)
In recognition of the changed international environment, Turkey 
has successfully lobbied the IMO to adopt new rules regulating the 
Straits. These rules provide for the adoption of a traffic separation 
scheme and certain mandatory restrictions on towage. Other provisions 
are generally of an advisory or exhortatory nature only. These rules 
appear likely to be accepted by the international community. To 
implement these IMO Rules, Turkey has adopted new national 
regulations, such as, the right to suspend navigation, to impose pilotage 
and to prohibit passage of large vessels. These rules are fiercely 
objected to by the Russian Federation and other Black Sea states. (30)
Following the recent "Nassia" accident, the Russian Diplomatic 
mission in Turkey has made an evaluation and their opposition regarding 
some changes over the Straits Regime has been on the following points: 
first, they can not sacrifice their right of free passage from the Straits. 
Second, there is no need to panic by an accident as this kind of accidents 
are the natural outcomes of civilization. Third, they should make an in- 
depth evaluation of the new regulations on the Straits. Finally, they claim
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that the tankers are paying very high amounts for passage and this 
money is enough to support security.(31)
After the discussions over the Maritime Regulations have gained 
an extensive impetus the Russian Federation has begun to oppose 
officially through the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, these 
oppositions have not been fruitful. Greece has also claimed officially that 
national problems can not be the excuse of the changes on international 
agreements and that Turkey is violating the Montreux Convention. (32)
The Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teodor Melescanu has 
said that they understand Turkey’s sensitivity to the issue and they have 
a flexible approach to the new regulations over the Straits. He has added 
that an accident which causes the closure of the Straits is not for their 
favor either. However, the Turkish Straits are Rumania's door to the 
Mediterranean, thus any prevention in the passage could mean their 
stopping economic activities through the Straits. Melescanu's suggestion 
has been that all parties concerned with the Straits should come together 
to discuss the regulations again. (33)
Finally, the governments of our neighbors are not happy with the 
new regulations as these may affect their activities through the Straits. It 
is a fact that the Turkish Straits are most of the Black Sea states' door to 
the Mediterranean and naturally it would be nonsense to say that their 
claims are unjust. However, the environmental NGOs of these states are 
aware of these problems between the states and they know that these 
can not find solutions because of the political, ethical and the
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governmental interests. All the NGOs agree on that point as the 
governmental systems and the political interests always lead the first 
place in their foreign policy agendas.
Simeon T. Nedjalkov who is the president of an environmental 
foundation - ABECOL - in Bulgaria and the Dean of Ecological Faculty of 
Environment says that Bulgaria would not oppose the precautions taken 
for the security of the Turkish Straits as the ecological pollution and 
especially the marine pollution will in anyway affect the Black Sea and 
the Black Sea coast of Bulgaria. He adds that the Black Sea is already 
polluted and certainly the strong currents in the Straits would carry the 
pollution to the Black Sea shores. He agrees that the Straits, as the door 
to the Mediterranean for all states in the Black Sea, should be protected 
ecologically and adds that the Bulgarian coasts are highly affected by 
marine pollution and tourism is also affected by this situation. Nedjalkov 
recommends that Turkey should be very careful on not making any 
discrimination during the application of these restrictions to prevent any 
kind of political opposition. According to him consistency in Turkey's 
actions towards this issue is very important.
Finally, on the question of the Montreux Convention, Nedjalkov 
suggests that instead of changing the Convention, the Black Sea states 
should come together only for the question of the Straits and make up 
another Convention for the passage regulations. He sums up his words 
by saying that he believes in one ideology and that is the "ecology" as the 
human being can not live without water, air and the natural environment;
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the environmental NGOs are now coming together to discuss ecological 
problems and to form and unite under this ideology. (34)
Engineer Octavian Ciobota, who is the President of the Ecology 
Foundation of Rumania, says that they have very good relations with 
Turkey and to preserve these, they can make some economic sacrifices. 
Ciobota, a journalist, a member of an environmentalist party in Romania 
and the president of the foundation, expects no opposition in this 
direction over the new "Maritime Regulations" of the Straits. (35)
Unfortunately, the member of an environmental movement, 
INTERLEGAL of Russian Federation, Mr. Yevgeny Sud'bin, is not as 
optimistic as his colleagues. He says that these two countries, Bulgaria 
and Rumania, do not have as many tankers as the Russian Federation 
has. So just to the contrary of what his Bulgarian and Rumanian 
colleagues have said, Mr. Sud'bin says that the government of the 
Russian Federation will certainly oppose the new regulations as it has 
many tankers using the Straits for trade purposes. (36)
The examples above illustrate the significance of NGOs for 
international environmental cooperation: The interaction between 
environmental NGOs is becoming increasingly more efficient. Especially 
after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the fall of the socialist 
regime, the environmental problems which were considered as the 
confidential issues of these states, have found a forum for collective 
discussion. Today, the environmentalist NGOs can come together to 
form some international groups and they are aware that they can find
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solutions and take collective actions without governmental interventions. 
Thus, from this point the importance of the NGOs on environmental 
issues cannot be disregarded.
Naturally the "Maritime Regulations" has been criticized for 
violating the Montreux Convention by some states who have economic 
interests over the Straits. However, according to the Turkish authorities, 
the regulations were prepared within the light of the Montreux Convention 
and have nothing contrary to its articles. The changes have been 
prepared for "protection" and the Convention's foreword says that "for the 
protection of the Turkish Republic and for those states who have a coast­
line in the Black Sea". Thus the concept of "protection" has been 
accepted by all the signatory states of the Montreux Convention and the 
discussions and the oppositions to the new regulations should take this 
point into account. (37)
Turkish Government authorities are very sensitive on not violating 
the Montreux Convention. Thus, speculations on this point are too weak 
to close the discussion of the "protection" of the Straits. Turkey does not 
seem to have any intention to close these states' trade way to the 
Mediterranean and does not have any aim to violate the Convention 
which gave her the right to regulate these international waterways. It is 
just for the protection of this region that Turkey has to take such 
measures.
The recent "Maritime Regulations" are still found unsatisfactory by 
the national authorities. In a panel which was organized by the Chamber
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of Environmental Engineers of Turkey on June 30, 1994, the authorities 
who have supported and praised the new regulations could not give 
answers to the following questions on the regulations;
-why is the obligation of pilotage only for Turkish vessels?
-when will the infrastructure and the personnel be maintained for a 
complete application of the regulations and will those regulations 
be successful without these requirements?
-will emergency plans be ready in case of other accidents? (38)
It is a sad fact that a high percentage of the accidents which have 
happened until today have resulted from the refusal to take pilotage and 
this number cannot be underestimated. Therefore experts are right on 
their criticisms about this fact and even the new regulations are not 
enough to protect the Turkish Straits.
Finally, it can be said that the recent "Maritime Regulations" are 
not found satisfactory. These have been put in force on July 1994 and 
although it is not possible to maintain any data to discuss their success, 
another accident which has happened on December 12, 1994 by the 
collision of a bulk carrier "Captain Nicholas" and an oil tanker "Athenian 
Harmony", luckily caused no pollution but has left doubts as to the 
success of the new "Maritime Regulations".
Within the framework of the global economy, the implementation of 
rules regarding foreign trade is necessary to develop and enforce 
environmental policies. As the environment is international, some of the
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policies like the Straits regime should be discussed on an international 
basis. Turkey has a right to protect her territory: this is tl^ ie foreign policy 
objective of every nation. However, the situation is different in the case 
of the Straits as they are the international trade ways of many states. 
Thus Turkey has a right to implement some restrictions so as to protect 
the environment and the population living around, the concerned states 
have a right to oppose as these restrictions may impose some restrictions 
on their free trade through these Straits.
As many states are concerned, this problem should be solved by 
international consensus as Prof.Nedjalkov has pointed out. In order to 
keep up the good relations with her neighbors and to find an everlasting 
solution for the marine pollution problem caused by the tanker accidents, 
Turkey must negotiate with all related parties and convince them as to the 
seriousness of the problem. Consequently, the problem is not only 
Turkey's problem, one way or other it is an international problem because 
of the international status of the Straits.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION
The Turkish Straits; the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are the 
historical treasures of Turkey and as all other natural sources and 
treasures, they should be protected. As presented in the second chapter, 
the' historical evolution of the Straits shows the Turkish struggle for 
protection of this region from 1700 to 1936. This nation had been 
successful in maintaining their protection for years, although it had to 
sacrifice from its jurisdictional rights in Lausanne. However, she had 
been an unforgettable example of power in changing an International 
Convention - the Lausanne Agreement - which gave away all her rights 
over the Straits and enforcing many states to sit together for another 
convention, on her favor - the Montreux Convention.
However, today's political arena differs from the 1930s. In the 
past, the lack of international organizations, the difficulties in holding 
summits prevented the states from coming together to discuss and solve 
problems. Environmental problems also were not as numerous as today 
and there were less problems resulting from technological and industrial 
developments.
There is one point that should be taken into account in this study 
that the Straits are very important to the Turkish nation. They are 
accepted as a national treasure both for their historical importance and 
their natural beauty. Today both the Straits and the populations living 
around them are in "danger". Danger in national politics may occur in 
time of war or a threat of w a r , however, in this case it may be caused by
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the inevitable increase of the accidents in the Straits. Thus it is a reality 
that they should be protected.
As explained in the third chapter, the sizes of the tankers and their 
cargo capacities are enormous today. Consequently, their passage over 
the Straits is creating problems. The solemn power in regulating the 
Straits, the Montreux Convention, is naturally unsatisfactory at the 
moment. The reason for that is, its articles are too old for today's 
technology and increasing industry. Thus, it is a fact that it requires 
some change.
The Government authorities, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and (he Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs, assert that it is not possible 
to abolish the Montreux Convention because our neighbors are 
concerned. The Turkish government is also unwilling to give up its 
sovereign rights over the Straits. They find the recent "Maritime 
Regulations" which were drawn up by maritime authorities, satisfactory. It 
is too early to discuss the reliability of the "Maritime Regulations", 
however, the most recent accident that has happened on December 12, 
1994, has reflected some pessimism over their expected performance.
Our neighbors are not happy with the new "Maritime Regulations" 
either. They claim that Turkey is violating the Montreux Convention with 
these regulations and it is not acceptable for them. It is natural to expect 
their opposition if we consider that the Straits are their "door" to thé 
Mediterranean.
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' It is very difficult to please all the parties when enforcement is 
jx)ncemed. It is very difficult but it is not impossible. Although there are 
many problems in international cooperation efforts, there are some 
conditions for maintaining healthy environmental cooperation, as 
described in Chapter four. The record of international legislation over 
marine pollution which has been given in the same chapter adds 
optimism to this problem.
It seems inevitable to evaluate such cases like the Turkish Straits 
from a non-political point of view but what has been discussed in this 
study is a case of environmental protection. Those accidents do not only 
pollute the sea, air and marine life but they have also put the lives of the 
population living in this region, danger. From this point of view, Turkey 
should insist on the concept of "protection" instead of enforcing 
regulations which she may not implement fully.
This study has not been prepared to discuss the Montreux 
Convention's amendments or Turkey's political interests. It aims to show 
the ecological danger that has occurred and will continue to occur. There 
are· ways for cooperation when the environment is concerned. Thus, all 
the states that are using this region should believe in this point and 
Turkey should do her best in convincing her neighbors to this truth.
Today's solutions, such as the application of regulations which all 
states oppose, are temporary solutions. Those states should come 
together under a common ideology that is "ecology" as Prof. Nedjalkov 
has mentioned and find a permanent solution by signing another
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b) the normal speed of vessels is to be 10 nautical miles per hour and specified rules apply to 
overtaking (Articles 17 and 18);
c) vessels which breakdown are subject to take compulsory pilotage (Article 19) and vessels in tow 
must be towed by a suitable tugboat of sufficient power (Article 21);
d) traffic may be temporarily halted by the Administration due to construction work (including 
underwater work, drilling, fire extinguishing, scientific and sports activities, aid and rescue 
operations, prevention and eradication of maritime pollution, pursuing criminals, accidents and 
similar cases). After temporary closure the priority in which waiting vessels will enter the Straits is to 
be determined by the relevant Traffic Control Stations (Article 24);
e) in circumstances of limited visibility the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles may be closed to vessels 
carrying hazardous cargo and large vessels, vessels with inadequate radar and maritime traffic may be 
limited to only one direction, or wliere visibility is less than 0.5 nautical miles closed to all traffic 
(Articles 41 and 51);
f) where a large vessel enters the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles with hazardous cargo, a similar 
vessel may not enter until the previous vessel has exited (Articles 42 and 52);
3.in the Bosphorus;
a) vessels 58 metres or greater in height cannot pass through the Bosphorus and vessels between 54 
and 58 metres require escort by tugboats (Article 38);
b) in the event of current speeds being in excess of specified speeds, large vessels, deep draught vessels 
and hazardous cargo carrying vessels will either not be permitted into the Bosphorus or will only be 
permitted depending on their speed (Article 40);
4. in the Dardanelles;
a)vessels shall not enter if the difference between their speed and the centre surface current is less than 
4 nautical miles per hour. Vessels the difference between whose speed and the slowest current is less 
than 4 nautical miles per hour require the assistance of a tug (Article 50).
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37. Convention for the Protection o f the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution Arbitration, 
1976
38. Protocol for the Protection o f the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based 
Sources, 1980
39. Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas, 1982 
40 . United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Sea, 1982
41. memorandum o f Understanding on Port State Control, 1982
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Executive summery
The present document presents ·  plan o f  actioa or strategy for rem edial m easures 
follow ing the accidental spillage o f  crude o il which occurred from 1 3 - 1 8  M arch 1994 within 
the Bosphorus and Black Sea. D u ^  this tim e, at least 200 cubic m etres o f  oil entered the 
w aters o f  the Straits o f Istanbul (9¿q>horus) and at least 1000-2000 cubic m etres discharged 
into the Black Sea to the W est o f  the en tn o ce  to the Bo^ihoras. Several hundred « iH f  
m eters o f  the oil discharged to  the open sea b  continuing to enter the B oqthorus carried by 
local w inds and currents. The docunoent recommends that a separate strategy be adopted for 
each o f  diese areas given that the sheltered roclgr in leb o f  the Boqihorus w ill tend to retain 
em ubified  liquid oil for considerable periods o f  tim e whereas open sandy beaches w ill be the 
area m ost likely to be impacted by oQ along the Black Sea coast The tw o s t r a l^ e s  w ill 
teqm ic sqiatate worlq;>lans, equipm ent and logistics and should be im plem ented by 
¡ndqienábnt task teams.
The strategy proposed for cleanm g up the Boqihorus consists o f  selecting and 
cleaning thirteen prioriQr sites, w hich are zones where oil b  likely to  be retained for long 
periods o f  time with a strong risk  o f  acting as future sources o f oil contam ination in  the area. 
Specific clean-tq> procedures are |xesented in  th b  docum ent It b  em{4iasized th a t w fthout 
e lean ing , oO contam inatíon b  likefy to  p e rs b t fo r m onths o r cvea y e a n .
In the case o f the Black Sea region, the m ost appropriate s tra t^ y  will be to  rem ove oil 
contam inated sand by mechanical m eans for subsequent disposal at land-fill sites, such as the 
d isused lignite workings raco u n tn ed  im m ediately inland fiom the coastline. T h b  operation 
should begin immediately after the liquid and emulsified oil has ceased being w ashed ashore.
In order to be successful, the strategy w ill require a large temporaiy workforce (o f  som e 500 
w o rk o s) and should inilially concentrate upon the restoration o f prioriQr sites o f  q)ecial 
in terest for nature em servation and recreatioiL
The document also outlines foe orgardzationa] fiwnewoik which would be essential in 
order successfully to implenaeiit foe above strategy. It comprises the following elem ents:
a national autboriiy w ith overall respcMisibility for cleanup operaticMts;
a  support team, including advisors;
officers in conunand o f  the each operational sector; and
site supervisors.
I f  the two strategics outlined are to  be successful, a strong local coordinating 
m echanism  must be conceived. The local teams must count on good facilities for 
com m unication, sufficient equipm ent and personnel, and the full sxqjpoit o f  all o ther sectors 
vriiich *'share a common vocation o r interest in restoring and protecting the marine 
environm ental resources o f the Republic o f  Turkey.
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1. Preamble
As ·  resuh o f the collisioa between the MT *Tjessia” nod the MV *^hip Broker” on 13 March 
1994 and the subsequent explosion and firc on board the **Nassia” there was serious oil 
contamination of the Bosphorus strait and, later, o f part o f the Tuvkish territorial waten of the Black 
Sea. The Government o f Turkey requested ||ie hssistance o f the Programme Coordinatftg Unit o f the 
GEF Black Sea Eoviroomeot Programme, together with the todmical support of the IMCVUNEP 
Regional Emergency Marine Pbllutioo Response Centre for the Medhenimean Sea (REMPEC). 
REMPEC mobilized Hs Medhemnean Assistance Unit, composed o f Mr. Darko Domovic, Technical 
Expert o f REMPEC and Mr. Francois Cabioc*h, Technical Expert O f CEORE (FianceX who were 
instrumental in preparing this document The Government also notified the Contracting Parties and 
signatories o f the Emergency ReqMOse Protocol o f the recently ratified Convention for the 
Protection of the Black Sea fifom Polhitiort Following the request o f the Turkish authorities, 
REMPEC informed the contracting parties to the Bmcelona Convention.
1 ^  Action Plan presented herein is a product o f cooperatioo at a national and intemational 
level; it f«»«* to ideotify a set of pragmatic remedial measures which might be taken in order to limit 
thn envirofunental damage resulting from this accidenL
2, CnrrcBt Sitaatio·
2.1 Bosphorus
A major part o f the oil initially released from the damaged tanker was consumed by the fire, 
and another significant part evaporated or dispersed naturally. The remainder spread within the 
limits o f the Bosphorus, where a portion of it still remains. By IS March 1994, it was estimated that 
approximately 100 to 200 cubic metres of weathered oil could still be found within the Bo^horus. 
This oil is mainly entrapped between rocks and boulders which form the shores of the StraH. 
According to changes in wind direction, entrapped oil was periodically released, thus creating areas 
o f sheen Ыегя>сп«(І patches of heavier, emulsified oil which may be seen along the
length o f the S trait As of 19 March, an additional large quantity o f oil bad begun to enter the 
Bosphorus from the Black Sea and the state of contamination o f the straits was continuing to worseiL
2.2 Black Sea
The *T4assia”, which continued to bum up to 17 March, has been towed into the Black Sea. 
As a result o f structural damages sustained by the vessel, $md in particular, the explosion which 
occurred on board the "Nassia” on 17 March, an additional quantity of oil has been released into the 
sea and has affected or is likely to affect the coast of the Black Sea to the West of the entrance to the 
Bosphorus. Part o f it has been reported to have entered into the Bosphorus. It is estimated that the 
quantity of oil threatening the Black Sea coasts is at least 1000 to 2000 cubic metres, while that 
y^ich has entered the Bosphorus might be several hundreds o f cubic metres.
3. Action Plan
The Bosphorus and Black Sea coastlines are vulnerable to two different types of oil 
pollution. Liquid (and emulsified liquid) oil predominates on the low-energy, rocky Bosphorus coast 
(much of the oil will adhere to the rocksX udiercas the majority o f the oil arriving on the high-energy
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Black Sea coast will adhere to the sand and damage beach resources. Tbe volume of oil discharged to 
the Black Sea was probably at least an order of magnitude greater than that which originally entered 
the Bosphorus. Two separate approaches are thus proposed for the clean-up methods which could be 
applied and to the organizatiooal and logistic aspects of response operatioos.
i . /  Bosphorus
Several aerial and boat surveys of the affected shores have been made by the member* of the 
Mediterranean Assistance Unit since their arrival on IS Match, in order to determine the best 
' possible approach to reqwnding to  the present poDutiott.
The type and quantity o f oil inhiatly present in the Bo^)bonis rendered impractical the use o f 
either mechanical containmeirt and recovery tochniqoes or chemical dispersioo small patches o f 
-weathered and/or emulsified oil surrounded with smaller or larger areas o f  very thin sheen, visible on 
' tbe sea surftce. Containmeid and recovery techniques should now be considered for the removal o f 
flotoihg oil which catered or is likely to enter the Boaphoms from the open Bfack Sea.
The shores of tbe Boq^borus are mainly formed o f  rocks, stones nnd several sm all: 
shingle beaches; large sections ate covered by man-made structures. Given that they ate oonstdered 
low-energy shores and that their self-cleaning capacity is expected to be negligible, the oil presently 
entrapped on these shores (or about to be entrapped) is likely to continue leaking and polluting the 
waters of tbe Strait for a very long period (up to several months) if  it is not removed as soon as 
possible.
Taking into consideration tbe characteristics o f tbe shoreline, as well as tbe present state o f 
the spilled oil, tbe following clean-up methods are deemed to be best adapted to the circumstances:
manual removal o f  stranded oil
use of vacuum trucks
flushing the ofl with low pressuie water
rock cleaning with high pressure cold or hot water
Tlie recommendations given here have been chosen because o f their flexibility (given tiurt lbs 
situatjon suddenly changes whh shifts m wind direction). To avoid tbe rcmobilisation o f the oil by 
tbe main stream in case o f wind diaitge, the basic Ime o f actioo should mvotve dosing a 
contaminated she by a floatii^ boom and sweeping as much as possible o f  the oil floating at the 
sürfece between the boom and the shoreline by mechanical or manual means. Tbe products collected 
will be mainly liquid. At least 500 cubic metres o f liquid waste may be produce^ which could be 
brought to existing oil recepCioa fecilities, those m Hjtydarpasa, for disposal. Solid waste b  not 
likely to exceed 100 too*.
With the assistance of tbe rq)re$eatative of the Istanbul Municipality, and on tbe basb o f the 
observations made on tbe sffA, tbe list o f areas where each o f these methods could (to used has been 
prepared. The map showing these areas b  attached. Full detaib o f clean-up praiebdures under 
differing scenarios are given in Appendix I to th b tq so rt
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• appointing officials in charge o f the Black Sea and Bosphorus operations, respectively;
•  creating response teams, with team leaders responsible to the officials above;
• organizing and coordinating the mobilizatioo o f public resources and o f resourres 
private sector or industry,
•  ensuring the necessaiy contacts are made with the different parties involved, e.g^ fTOPF, P A I, 
and salvers;
•  upon advise ofthe support and advisory team, decide on the need for intematiooal assistance;
. a - g j v e  instructions and organize the recording o f actions taken.
0
The teams should be supported by an “Emergcocy Raqroose” committee formed cfntrafljy on 
an ad-hoc basis by the Ministry o f the Eavtronmeal and including relevant persons from the 
ministries involved and by high-level represerrtahVe i r^ielevant local authorities.
The spill response teams should include two qualified technical staff with local knowledge 
and contacts, at least one secretary to answer the telephone and to type reports and writtM 
instructioos, requests etc., and a driver with a vehicle s u i^ le  for teaching the affected arc·. The 
task teams should draw up workplans and list all o f the other players with whom they should ttaif^ 
a regular basis, the equipment which can be made available to them and the progress made. The two 
team leaders should also confor together at least daily
It is extremely important that the teams be boused in a place with good communkatioos, ieL, 
a direct telqrfiooe line and fiuc machine, yet is reasonably ctom to the spill area. The team leaden 
should have technical knowledge o f environmental protectioo and be able to liaise with foreipi 
(generally English-Creaking) teams provkfing support and services (such as the Intematiooal Tanker 
Owners Pollutioo FederatiooX They should be provided with an office where noisy visitors tad 
negotiaiioois can be clearly s^ re gated from operatkms requiring undivided attentioo or p riv a^ . 
Together with the higher authorities» they will also have to discern between carious and bona fide 
oBen o f assistance. It may be considered appropriate to boose at least one o f the teams hi the local 
focilities o f the Ministry o f  Environment i^ k h  is centrally located and has good telqihooe iwikf. 
This would reduce the large amount o f time c>ent traveling between the present temporary cadre and 
those places providing assistance or informatk«.
5. External Assistance
The GEF Black Sea Enyiroruneat Programme will be pleased to assist the Govemment o f 
Turkey to the extent possible during the present em ergei^ . The Programme is ¡xoviding support for 
the work o f the experts from REMPEC and will be taking steps to frirmulate a region-wide strategy 
for emergency response based upon the provisions o f  the Conventioo for the Protection of the Black 
Sea to which Turkey is a Contracting Party.
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Appendix I:
Oil Clenn>ap Scenarios
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SCENARIO 1 
BOSPHORUS
DcscripHoa
Heavy cooccntratioo of oil in sites (bays, ports...)· Oil floating
P riac ip k
Close the bay with a floating boom. The length o f the boom will depend on the length o f 
shore to be closed. The boom should be attached at each end by a rope to rocks or another strong 
support Each 100 metres, a SO kilos anchor should be used to secure i t  It must be kept up to the 
wind.
'
The oil will be removed by pumping it by a centrifugal or preferably diaphragm pump or 
Ь у ^у асц ш  tank, such as those used in die ftrms or by municipalities for sewage removal.
Final mopping op can be achieved by sorbent material (mats,sbeets,stc.) which have to be 
stored in separate containers (buckets or plastic sacks) once soaked with ofl.
ReaMvlBgofl
The suction hose of the pump or vacuum unit should be maintained as close as possible to 
the surface to avoid pumping too much water. The suction hose should be guided or fed by personnel, 
using scoops or shovels from a small boat
If the shore is accessible by trucks, vacuum tanks can be used. These vacuum tanks should 
be e a ^  to empty or to clean. If no vacuum tank is available, a pomp (diaphragm or centrifugal) could 
be iwed, These should be e a ^  to handle and m ^  be placed on a floating raft
The mixture trf^ ofl and water should be collected m mobile tanks (20 m3) or in tank trucks. 
Where the shore is not accessible, empty oil drums (200 0  can be filled, closed and subsequently 
evacuated by lending craft of the Navy.
M aterial needed in r lo t BMtres of shore
.  150 metres ofboom, one anchor, 50 metres o f rope
Small boat (3-4 metre) with paddles.
.  Two pumpmg units (vacuum, diaphragm or centrifiigalX completed 
with hoses (2x 20 metres).
• Temporary storage: about 50 drums (2001), depending on
Де amount of mlAvater mixture, or two 10 to 20m3 tanks (possible 
source for mobile, flexible, oil resistent tanks: Fire Brigade).
• Two or three shuttle tank trucks to bring the oil to the disposal site.
50 heavy duty plastic bags (1001) to recover oily debris
>  .  lOshoveb
Регаовве! required
10 workers and a foreman fully equipped with gloves, waterproof clothes, boots, lifejackets for those 
which are in the small boats, food, drink, cleaning material.
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SC EN A R IO  2 
B O SPH O RU S
O escriptio·
Rocky shore polluted by oil. Uie oil is not floating but is stuck on the boulders or rocks.
Principle
The rocks are cteanedt^ the means o f  a high pressure je t  Deteched oil floats beck to the
surftce. To avoid any escaping o f released oil and recootamination o f another area, a length o f boom 
sbdbld be deployed around the work she.
The floating oQ released from the coated surfaces is then removed using the tame 
procedure as described in Scenario No 1.
Although manual cleaning (using brushes, brooms etc by hand) is possible, it is a long and 
Astidious procedure. There is no need to use cleaning agent and the removal the boulders is not 
advisable.
The pressure jet has to have approximately 30 to 60 bars and requires an anti-corrosioo 
treated pump, as well as personal protection equipment for the operators.
Eqnlp
In this case the use of a sorbent boom tor collecting released oil can help the recovery.
it required for a 100 aMtres loaq; stre teh  o f coastfiae
Boom, ropes, pumping and vacuum equqxnem, temporary storage...
(same as in Scenario N o.l)
2 (two) high pressure jets whh hoses (one unh can clean 
qiproximatety 1 m%9inote)
Sorbent (one rolQ nnd/br sorhent boom (possibly)
10 plastic garbage bins (1001)
Personnel req aired
10 workmen and a foreman, fully equipped
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SCENARIOS
BOSPHORUS
Priacipl*
Polluted sand and pebble shore.
Dcacriptfoa
tb e  principal cleaning procedure ta manual removal o f polluted sediments with shoveb,
rakea and bocicets. If there is no access by car 10 the shore line, a landing craft can be used to bring m
and out personnel, equipment and collected debris.
^  this case, the debris is solid (oDed sand, oiled pebbles). These have to be stored either 
into strong (heavy duty) plastic bags or 100 litre bockets.
If the site is accessible by car, trailers used in civfl eagineering should be useluL 
Equipment needed for l i t  BMires long slle 
10 shovels and 5 rakes
100 strong, heavy doty plastic bags (100 litres)
10 buckets (SO litres)
Personnel required
S men and a foreman equipped with boots and gloves
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